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Putting	Political	Constitutionalism	in	its	Place	
Abstract	
The	question	of	the	legitimacy	of	judicial	review	of	legislative	and	to	a	lesser	extent,	administrative,	action	is	
a	 perennial	 theme	 in	 constitutional	 studies.	 	 However	 recent	 years	 have	 seen	 particular	 attention	 to	 this	
question	in	political	theory,	notably	in	the	work	of	Jeremy	Waldron	and	Richard	Bellamy,	who	have	provided	
robust	 normative	 defences	 of	 legislative	 supremacy	 in	 questions	 of	 constitutional	 design.	 	 Both	 of	 their	
approaches,	however,	through	their	 insistence	on	‘disagreement	all	the	way	down’,	have	come	up	against	
the	 challenge	 that	 their	 positions	 are	 ultimately	 self-defeating.	 	 	 This	 paper	 attempts	 to	 take	 up	 this	
challenge	 to	 theories	 of	 political	 constitutionalism	 by	 adding	 an	 additional	 layer	 of	 moral	 arguments	 to	
defend	 legislative	 supremacy	 through	 a	 minimal	 theory	 of	 legitimacy.	 	 As	 it	 relies	 on	 providing	 moral	
reasons	 for	 resisting	a	move	 from	political	 to	 legal	constitutionalism	only	 in	 those	 jurisdictions	where	 it	 is	
actually	currently	practiced,	as	opposed	to	a	more	general	argument	as	to	why	political	constitutionalism	is	
the	most	legitimate	form	of	constitutional	design	in	constitutional	democracies,	it	is	therefore	only	a	partial	
defence	of	political	 constitutionalism.	 	However,	given	 that	 the	defences	of	political	 constitutionalism	are	
self-defeating	 on	 their	 own	 terms,	 the	 paper	 concludes	 that	 the	 conditions	 of	 this	 partial	 defence	 are	 a	
necessary	prior	to	theoretical	defenses	of	legislative	supremacy.	
1. Introduction
The	 past	 number	 of	 decades	 have	 seen	 an	 inexorable	 rise	 in	 the	 number	 of	 jurisdictions	 practicing	
judicial	 review	of	 legislative	and	administrative	measures,	particularly	 for	compatibility	with	 fundamental	
rights	 standards.1	 This	 ‘judicialization	of	 politics’2	 can	be	 attributed	 to	 two	main	 features	 of	 the	postwar	
era;	 the	 rise	 of	 supranational	 rights	 adjudication,	 particularly	 in	 Europe,	 as	well	 as	 the	 spread	 of	 liberal	
ideals	 in	the	aftermath	of	the	end	of	the	cold	war.3	 	 	These	developments	have	also	affected	jurisdictions	
such	as	those	which	traditionally	followed	the	Westminster	parliamentary	model	based	on	the	doctrine	of	
1	See	generally,	B.	Ackerman,		’The	Rise	of	World	Constitutionalism’	(1997)	83	Va.	L.	Rev.	771;	T.	Ginsburg,	’The	Global	
Spread	of	Constitutional	Review’	in	K.	Whittington,	R.	Kelemen	and	G.	Caldeira	(eds.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Law	
and	Politics,	(OUP,	2008).	
2	S.	Shapiro	and	A.	Stone	Sweet,	On	Law,	Politics	and	Judicialization,	(OUP	2002).	
3	See	L.	Hefler	&	A.-M.	Slaughter,	’Toward	a	Theory	of	Effective	Supranational	Adjudication’	(1997)	107(2)	YLJ	273-392;	
A. Stone	Sweet	and	H.	Keller,		A	Europe	of	Rights:		The	Impact	of	the	ECHR	on	National	Legal	Systems,	(OUP	2008);	W.
Sadurski,	Rights	before	Courts:	A	Study	of	Constitutional	Courts	in	Postcommunist	States	of	Central	and	Eastern
Europe,	(Springer,	2005).
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parliamentary	supremacy	or	the	Nordic	model	of	judicial	review.4		Even	the	blueprint	for	the	Westminster	
model	of	government,	the	U.	K.,	has	not	escaped	these	developments.5	
	 This	 increased	 judicialization	 of	 politics	 has	 coincided	 with	 a	 lively	 debate	 in	 political	 and	
constitutional	 theory	 surrounding	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	practice	 in	 constitutional	 democracies,	 framed	 in	
terms	of	the	opposition	between	legal	and	political	constitutionalism.6		Whereas	the	fields	of	political	and	
legal	 constitutionalism	entail	 issues	beyond	 the	admittedly	 somewhat	 stylized	dichotomy	of	 the	ultimate	
decision-making	 powers	 of	 legislative	 assemblies	 or	 courts,7	 it	 is	 within	 this	 dichotomy	 that	 these	 ideas	
receive	their	most	common	expression.8		As	such,	the	most	popular	front	of	contestation	between	political	
and	legal	constitutionalism	has	been	with	regard	to	the	question	of	whether	courts	or	 legislatures	should	
have	 ultimate	 decision-making	 authority	 on	 the	 identification,	 interpretation	 and	 application	 of	 the	
fundamental	values,	usually	expressed	as	 fundamental	 rights,	of	a	particular	 legal	order	or	 constitutional	
settlement.9			Given	the	fact	that	this	question	is	primarily	institutional,	then,	this	question	can	be	framed	in	
terms	 of	 the	 opposition	 between	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	 and	 institutional	 legal	
constitutionalism.10		
	 This	 paper	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 theoretical	 defence	 of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	
from	 two	 prominent	 theorists	 in	 the	 field,	 Jeremy	 Waldron	 and	 Richard	 Bellamy	 who	 have	 developed	
																																								 																				
4	See	generally	S.	Gardbaum,	The	New	Commonwealth	Model	of	Constitutionalism	(CUP,	2013);	'Symposium:		Nordic	
Juristocracy'	(2011)	9(2)	Int	J	Constitutional	Law	449-547.	
5	See	generally,	A.	Kavanagh,	Constitutional	Review	under	the	UK	Human	Rights	Act	(CUP,	2009).	
6	The	debate	in	the	Anglophone	world	has	been	dominated	by	the	UK	context	see,	for	example,	J.	A.	G.	Griffith,	‘The	
Political	Constitution’	(1979)	42(1)	Modern	Law	Review	1-21;		G.	Gee	and	G.	Webber,	‘What	Is	a	Political	Constitution?’	
(2010)	30(2)	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies,	273-299.		However	US	scholars	have	also	dealt	with	the	issue,	see	M.	
Tushnet,	Taking	the	Constitution	Away	from	the	Courts,	(PUP,	2000),	L.	D.	Kramer,	The	People	Themselves:		Popular	
Constitutionalism	and	Judicial	Review,	(OUP,	2004).		For	a	recent	discussion	of	general	themes	both	within	and	beyond	
the	UK	context	see	the	special	issue	M.	Goldoni	&	C.	MacCorkindale	(eds.)	‘Political	Constitutions’	(2013)	14	German	
Law	Journal	available	at:	www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1595		
7	See	for	example	S.	Tierney,	’Whose	Political	Constitution?:		Citizens	and	Referendums’	in	Goldoni	&	MacCorkindale	
(2013).	
8	See	Gee	and	Webber,	(2010).	
9	J.	Waldron,	’A	Right-Based	Critique	of	Constitutional	Rights’	(1993)	13(1)	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	18-51.	
10	The	terms	‘Institutional	Political	Constitutionalism’	will	be	used	interchangeably	with	‘legislative	supremacy’	
throughout	this	paper	as	will	‘institutional	legal	constitutionalism’	and	‘judicial	supremacy’.	
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sophisticated	 defences	 of	 legislative	 supremacy	 from	 the	 viewpoints	 of	 liberalism	 and	 republicanism	
respectively.11	 	More	specifically,	 it	will	 focus	on	a	powerful	critique	of	 these	positions	which	argues	that	
they	are	incoherent	or	self-defeating	due	to	their	insistence	on	disagreement	‘all	the	way	down’.12		In	the	
light	 of	 the	 shift	 to	 judicial	 supremacy	 in	 recent	 times,	 the	 paper	 argues,	 this	 challenge	 is	 of	 particular	
practical	 and	 political	 import.	 	 The	 paper	 therefore	 attempts	 to	 salvage	 a	 theoretical	 defence	 of	
institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	 by	 overcoming	 its	 self-defeating	 nature	 through	 the	 addition	 of	 a	
minimal	theory	of	 legitimacy	to	Waldron	and	Bellamy’s	accounts.	 	This	has	the	result	of	creating	a	strong	
moral	presumption	 in	 favour	of	political	 constitutionalism	where	practiced.	 	This	presumption,	 combined	
with	Waldron	and	Bellamy’s	defences	of	legislative	supremacy,	combine	to	defeat	arguments	for	a	switch	
to	 institutional	 legal	 constitutionalism,	 particularly	 on	 fundamental	 rights	 grounds.	 As	 it	 only	 provides	
reasons	for	the	preservation	of	actually	existing	practices	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism,	rather	
than	a	more	general	account	of	the	per	se	superior	legitimacy	of	political	constitutionalism,	it	is	therefore	
only	a	partial	defence,	incorporating	an	important	contingent	fact	of	the	state	of	constitutional	practice	in	
particular	 jurisdictions.	 	 	Nonetheless,	 in	 the	 light	of	 the	self-defeating	nature	of	 stand-alone	defences	of	
institutional	political	constitutionalism,	the	paper	argues,	this	is	as	good	as	it	gets	for	institutional	political	
constitutionalism	 and	 the	 minimal	 theory	 of	 legitimacy	 constitutes	 a	 necessary	 prior	 condition	 for	 a	
successful	theoretical	defense	of	the	legitimacy	of	legislative	supremacy.	
																																								 																				
11	See	generally	Waldron	(1993),	J.	Waldron,	Law	and	Disagreement,	(OUP	1999)	(hereinafter	LD),	J.	Waldron,	‘The	
Core	of	The	Case	Against	Judicial	Review’	(2005)	115	Yale	Law	Journal,	1346,	(hereinafter	‘Core	Case’),	R.	Bellamy,	‘The	
Political	Form	of	the	Constitution:		the	Separation	of	Powers,	Rights	and	Representative	Democracy’	(1996)	XLIV	
Political	Studies	436-456,		R.	Bellamy,	Political	Constitutionalism,	(CUP	2007)	(hereinafter	PC),	Richard	Bellamy,	
‘Political	Constitutionalism	and	the	Human	Rights	Act’	(2011)	9	International	Journal	of	Constitutional	Law	86	
12	See	generally	T.		Christiano,	‘Waldron	on	Law	and	Disagreement’	(2000)	19	Law	and	Philosophy	513-543.		Different	
versions	of	the	critique	can	be	found	in	J.	Raz,	‘Disagreement	in	Politics’	(1998)	43	Am.	J.	Juris.	25,	,	C.	Fabre,	‘The	
Dignity	of	Rights’	(2000)	20(2)	O.J.L.S.	271-282,	C.	L.	Eisgruber,	‘Democracy	and	Disagreement:		A	Common	on	Jeremy	
Waldron’s	Law	and	Disagreement’	(2002)	6	N.Y.U.	J.	Legis.	&	Pub.	Pol’y	65,	A.	Kavanagh.	‘Participation	and	Judicial	
Review:		A	Reply	to	Jeremy	Waldron’	(2003)	22	Law	and	Philosophy	451-486.		Whereas	all	of	these	pieces	deal	
specifically	to	Waldron’s	defence,	they	apply,	with	minor	modifications	also	to	Bellamy’s	republican	defence.		See	Part	
3.	
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		 The	paper	proceeds	as	follows.		Part	2	provides	a	brief	summary	of	the	general	contours	of	
Waldron	 and	 Bellamy’s	well-known	defences	 of	 legislative	 supremacy.	 	 	 Part	 3	 explains	 the	 challenge	 to	
their	 defences	 of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 they	 are	 ultimately	 self-
defeating.		Part	4	identifies	the	primary	problem	with	these	accounts	as	failures	as	theories	of	authority	and	
Part	5	provides	an	outline	of	a	theory	of	authority,	the	minimal	theory	of	legitimacy	which	compensates	for	
the	gaps	in	Waldron	and	Bellamy’s	defences	qua	theories	of	authority.		
2. Waldron	and	Bellamy	on	Disagreement	
In	defending	the	practice	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism,	both	Waldron	and	Bellamy	depart	
from	 the	 ‘circumstances	 of	 politics’,	 that	 is	 the	 ‘felt	 need	 among	 the	members	 of	 a	 certain	 group	 for	 a	
common	 framework	 or	 decision	 or	 course	 of	 action	 on	 some	matter,	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	 disagreement	
about	what	that	framework,	decision	or	action	should	be.’13	 	 In	the	circumstances	of	politics,	not	only	do	
we	disagree	about	the	meaning	of	the	good,	but	we	also	disagree	about	the	right,	and	the	origins,	nature	
and	meaning	of	fundamental	rights	as	well	as	the	values	which	they	purport	to	protect,	yet	we	still	require	
collective	 action	 on	 these	matters.	 	 	 	 As	 such,	 and	 notwithstanding	 such	 disagreement,	 some	 decision-
making	 authority	 is	 necessary	 which	 acts	 by	 resolving	 the	 disagreement	 about	 the	 right	 and	 the	 good	
without	replicating	it.		However,	for	both	Waldron	and	Bellamy	we	also	need	a	decision-making	procedure	
which	is	worthy	of	the	respect	of	those	over	whom	decisions	are	made;	that	is	a	decision-making	authority	
which	is	legitimate.			For	both	Waldron	and	Bellamy,	the	most	legitimate	form	of	decision-making	authority,	
is	 one	 which	 makes	 decisions	 according	 to	 a	 procedure	 which	 is	 respectful	 of	 all	 citizens	 involved	 in	
disagreement	by	treating	them	equally,14		that	is	where	they	are	‘regarded	as	equals	and	their	multifarious	
rights	 and	 interests	 accorded	 equal	 respect	 and	 concern.’15	 	 Whereas	 they	 draw	 on	 different	 political	
theories	 in	order	 to	 give	 content	 to	 their	understandings	of	 the	equality	 and	 liberty	of	 individuals	 in	 the	
																																								 																				
13	LD,	102.	PC	5.	
14	LD,	109.	
15	PC,	5.	
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circumstances	of	politics	–	Waldron	drawing	on	liberal	political	equality,	Bellamy	on	republican	freedom		-	
they	both	conclude	that	in	questions	of	institutional	design,	and	particularly	the	choice	between	judicial	or	
legislative	supremacy	with	regard	to	decision-making	in	the	circumstances	of	politics,	that	the	latter	form	
best	respects	their	premises	of	equality	 in	the	face	of	disagreement,	and	is	therefore	the	most	 legitimate	
form	of	institutional	design.16	
	 More	specifically,	Waldron	identifies	two	types	of	reasons	for	determining	the	legitimacy	of	
decision-making	by	courts	and	legislatures;	consequentialist	 ‘out-come	related	reasons’	and	deontological	
‘processed-related	 reasons’.17	 He	 examines	 the	 reasons	 for	 and	 against	 courts	 and	 legislatures	 based	 on	
both	of	these	types	of	reasons,	concluding	that	the	case	for	either	 judicial	or	 legislative	supremacy	based	
on	 outcome-related	 reasons	 is	 inconclusive	 (or	 argues	 in	 favour	 of	 legislatures),	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	
empirically	 courts	 have	 proven	 no	 better	 than	 legislatures	 in	 preventing	 rights	 violations	 and	 that	 the	
outcomes-based	reasons	for	favouring	courts,	such	as	reason-giving,	focus	on	particular	cases	etc.	apply	as	
much	 to	 legislatures	or	don’t	apply	 to	either.18	 	Process-based	 reasons,	however,	Waldron	argues,	weigh	
wholly	 in	 favour	 of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism.19	 	 	 This	 latter	 position	 forms	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
‘core’20	 of	 the	 case	 in	 favour	 of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism.	 	 The	 process	 based	 reasons	 for	
institutional	political	constitutionalism	as	a	more	legitimate	form	of	constitutional	design	is	predicated,	as	
noted	 above,	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 political	 equality,	 and	 particularly	 the	 equality	 of	 citizen’s	 influence	 in	
decision-making.		The	optimal	way	to	secure	this,	for	Waldron,	is	through		‘fair	elections	to	the	legislature	
where	 [citizens]	 are	 treated	 equally	 along	 with	 their	 fellow	 citizens.’21	 	 Furthermore,	 majority	 decision-
making	within	 the	 representative	 legislature	 allows	 for	 decisions	 to	 be	made	while	 treating	 participants	
equally,	giving	‘each	expressed	opinion	the	greatest	weight	possible	compatible	with	giving	equal	weight	to	
																																								 																				
16	PC	Ch.	1;		Waldron,	‘Core	Case’,	above.	
17	’Core	Case’,	1372-3.	
18	’Core	Case’,	1376-1386.	
19	‘Core	Case’,	p.	1393.	
20	’Core	Case’,	1346.	
21	‘Core	Case’,	1387.	
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all	 opinions.’22	 	Waldron	 illustrates	 this	 idea	 by	 reference	 to	 a	 hypothetical	 citizen	 Cn.	 	 For	Waldron	 the	
legitimacy	of	decision-making	 turns	on	giving	reasons	 to	 this	hypothetical	citizen,	 ‘who	 is	 to	be	bound	or	
burdened’23	by	a	decision	with	which	she	disagrees	as	 to	why	she	should	 ‘accept,	comply	or	put	up	with	
it.’24	 	More	 specifically,	 legitimacy,	 for	Waldron,	 involves	 furnishing	adequate	 responses	 to	 two	potential	
questions	which	Cn	could	raise	about	the	decision-making	process;	how	are	the	decision-makers	legitimate	
and	why	didn’t	Cn’s	opinion	on	the	matter	carry	greater	weight	in	the	decision-making	process.25		This	test,	
according	to	Waldron,	constitutes,	‘the’	theory	of	political	legitimacy.26			For	Waldron,	legislative	supremacy	
provides	a	much	more	convincing	account	than	judicial	supremacy	as	to	why	Cn	should	accept	the	decision	
due	to	the	 fact	 that	majority	decision	 in	a	 legislature	–	unlike	 in	Courts	 -	 ‘treats	participants	equally,	and	
givens	 each	 expressed	 opinion	 the	 greatest	 weight	 possible	 compatible	 with	 giving	 equal	 weight	 to	 all	
opinions.’27			
In	a	manner	very	similar	to	Waldron,	Bellamy	adopts	two	criteria	of	the	legitimacy	of	decision-making	
which	overlap	squarely	with	Waldron’s	two	questions	raised	in	relation	to	the	hypothetical	citizen	Cn;	that	
a	citizen	must	feel	that	there	is	no	difference	in	status	between	them	and	the	decision-makers	and	that	the	
reason	that	more	weight	wasn’t	given	to	a	particular	citizen’s	opinion	cannot	be	based	on	the	contention	
that	the	‘winners’	held	an	objectively	‘correct’	view	on	some	matter.28		For	Bellamy,	these	criteria	are	best	
satisfied	according	a	‘standard	democratic	process’	of	decision-making.29		It	is	only	in	this	way	that	citizens	
are	able	to	step	back	from	the	decision	 itself	and	see	the	 legitimacy	of	the	process	of	decision-making	as	
securing	 the	 ‘equal	 concern	and	 respect’30	of	 fellow	citizens.	 	However	 the	 ‘distinctiveness’31	of	decision-
making	according	to	institutional	political,	rather	than	legal,	constitutionalism,	for	Bellamy	lies	 in	 its	 ‘non-
																																								 																				
22	‘Core	Case’,	1388.	
23	‘Core	case’,	p.	1387.	
24	‘Core	case’,	p.	1387	
25	‘Core	case’,	1387.	
26	‘Core	case’,	1387.	
27	‘Core	case’,	1388.	
28	PC,	164-5.	
29	PC,	164-5.	
30	PC,	165.	
31	PC,	165.	
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dominating	 character’32	 as	 an	 account	 inspired	 by	 republican	 freedom	 rather	 than	 political	 liberalism.33		
Courts	 cannot	 enjoy	 such	 legitimacy	 as	 judges	 implicitly	 claim	 a	 status	 superior	 to	 individual	 citizens	 in	
decision-making	 in	 institutional	 legal	 constitutionalism	and	have	no	 incentives	 to	 adopt	 the	 viewpoint	of	
individual	 citizens.34	 Given	 their	 implicitly	 claimed	 superior	 status,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 decision-
making	they	can	give	their	own	opinions	more	weight	than	that	of	individual	citizens	on	the	mere	grounds	
that	they	are	in	a	position	to	‘impose	their	opinion’35,	the	rule	of	judges	‘cannot	be	other	than	arbitrary	and	
hence	dominating.’36	
In	terms	of	the	types	of	reasons	which	militate	in	favour	of	legislative	over	judicial	supremacy,	Bellamy,	
like	Waldron,	 argues	 for	 the	 priority	 of	 process-based	 reasons	 over	 outcomes-based	 reasons.	 	 However,	
Bellamy	argues	against	severing	process	and	outcomes	based	reasons	when	considering	the	 legitimacy	of	
procedures	given	that	even	if	we	agreed	on	outcomes	–	which	in	the	circumstances	of	politics	we	do	not	–	
procedural	questions	would	still	need	to	be	addressed	in	order	to	secure	those	particular	outcomes.37		As	
such,	 we	 cannot	 be	 wholly	 agnostic	 about	 procedures,	 even	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 outcomes,	 given	 that	 the	
design	of	the	procedures	will	necessarily	affect	the	desired	outcomes.38			Furthermore,	in	some	cases,	the	
actual	outcomes	may,	in	practice,	diverge	from	those	envisaged	and	as	such	procedure	needs	to	carry	some	
‘independent	normative	weight’,	 39	even	on	an	outcomes-based	 focus.40	 	 	As	such,	 then,	outcomes-based	
reasons	 can	 be	 subsumed	 into	 process-based	 ones.	 	 The	 upshot	 of	 this	 is	 that	 when	 looking	 at	 the	
legitimacy	of	decision-making	in	the	circumstances	of	politics,	procedure	is	where	the	real	action	is.		In	this	
light,	then,	legislatures	are	more	legitimate	than	courts	for	both	procedural	and	outcomes-based	reasons,	
from	the	viewpoint	of	a	republican	interpretation	of	treating	citizens	with	‘equal	respect	and	concern’.	
																																								 																				
32	PC,	165.	
33	PC,	Chapter	4.	
34	PC,	166.	
35	PC,	166.	
36	PC,	167.	
37	PC,	172.	
38	PC,	171.	
39	PC,	172.	
40	PC,	172.	
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3. Disagreeing	about	disagreement	
The	root	of	the	problem	with	these	defences	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism	lies	in	
the	 issue	 of	 disagreement	 about	 procedures	 in	 the	 circumstances	 of	 politics.	 	 As	 will	 be	 recalled,	 the	
circumstances	of	politics	relates	to	a	consensus	among	citizens	that	collective	decision-making	is	necessary	
notwithstanding	disagreement	among	those	citizens	about	the	substantive	content	of	collective	decisions	
involving	both	the	right	and	the	good.		However,	as	well	as	disagreeing	about	the	right	and	the	good,	the	
‘framework’41	 for	decisions	will	 ‘also	be	 the	subject	of	political	debate’42,	a	 fact	which	both	Waldron	and	
Bellamy	explicitly	envisage	in	their	accounts	of	the	circumstances	of	politics.43		In	terms	of	the	terrain	of	the	
debate	between	institutional	political	and	legal	constitutionalism,	then,	as	well	as	expecting	disagreement	
about	both	the	right	and	the	good,	we	must	also	expect	reasonable	disagreement	about	the	fairest	or	most	
legitimate	way	 to	proceed	 in	 the	 circumstances	of	politics;	 that	 is,	 that	we	must	expect	disagreement	 to	
emerge	about	whether	in	fact	legislative	supremacy	is	the	most	legitimate	response	to	the	circumstances	of	
politics.			
This	 type	 of	 disagreement	 can	 be	 illustrated	 by	 co-opting	 Waldron’s	 hypothetical	 citizen	
discussed	 above,	 Cn,	 and	 imaging	 a	 scenario	 whereby	 a	 court	 has	 struck	 down	 a	 piece	 of	 legislation	
excluding,	 for	example,	certain	 individuals	such	as	prisoners	from	the	right	to	vote.	 	 In	this	scenario,	Cn’s	
representative	voted	in	favour	of	the	impugned	legislation	and	it	is	a	law	with	which	she	agrees.	In	taking	
up	Waldron’s	gambit	regarding	his	own	definition	of	legitimacy,	we	need	to	furnish	her	with	reasons	as	to	
why	the	Court’s	decisions	striking	down	the	law	is	 legitimate	from	the	viewpoint	of	political	equality,	and	
particularly	her	equal	standing	with	her	fellow	citizens	–	that	is	why	the	decision-makers	are	legitimate	and	
why	her	opinion	wasn’t	given	more	weight	in	the	decision.			What	a	defender	of	the	Court’s	decision	could	
say	is	that	while	it	is	true	that	the	law	struck	down	was	one	which	was	approved	by	Cn’s	representative	in	
																																								 																				
41	LD,	102.	
42	PC,	5.	
43	Ibid	and	LD,	102.	
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the	legislature	and	one	with	which	she	personally	agreed,	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	weight	of	opinion	of	
those	 potentially	 excluded	 by	 the	 law	 was	 given	 equal	 status	 with	 her	 own,	 a	 body	 external	 to	 the	
legislature	was	necessary	to	scrutinize	its	activities	to	ensure	that	it	remains	legitimate	such	that	the	access	
and	participation	of	 citizens	 like	 herself	 on	 equal	 terms,	 is	 secured.44	Whereas	Cn	was	 the	 ‘loser’	 of	 this	
particular	decision,	in	upholding	the	equality	of	access	to	the	legislature	through,	for	example	the	right	to	
vote,	 in	 the	 future	she	 too	may	benefit	 from	this	decision,	 so	 if	 she	 looks	at	 it	 in	 the	broader	 scheme	of	
things,	as	a	voter	whose	equality	was	upheld	in	this	decision,	she,	as	a	citizen,	is	fact	a	‘winner’.		Now,	Cn	
doesn’t	have	to	accept	these	particular	reasons	but	she	doesn’t	objectively	have	any	less	reason	to	discount	
them	than	she	does	to	accept	Waldron’s	reasons	for	the	superior	legitimacy	of	legislative	supremacy	when	
a	particular	decision	hasn’t	gone	her	way,	 if	 she	believes	 in	political	equality.	 	Both	positions	claim	to	be	
securing	 the	 equality	 and	 voice	 of	 Cn,	 albeit	 in	 different	 ways	 and	 through	 different	 means.45	 It	 will	
ultimately	depend	on	whether	Cn	is	persuaded	more	by	either	argument.	 	Extrapolating	further	this	basis	
for	disagreement	about	the	legitimacy	of	procedures,	even	if	Cn	does	not	believe	that	political	equality	 is	
best	respected	by	courts	in	the	manner	outlined	above,	in	the	circumstances	of	politics	we	would	be	likely	
to	 find	 citizens	who	 do	 believe	 that	 respecting	 political	 equality	 or	 republican	 freedom	 requires	 judicial	
intervention.46	Given	their	acceptance	of	citizens’	 ‘burdens	of	 judgment’47	 it	 is	not	available	to	Bellamy	or	
Waldron	to	claim	that	such	individuals	are	being	deliberately	obtuse	in	believing	that	judicial	intervention	is	
necessary	to	protect	political	equality	or	republican	freedom.48			
In	 the	 light	 of	 disagreement	 about	 procedures	 in	 the	 circumstances	 of	 politics,	 then,	 a	
further	procedure	will	be	necessary	to	resolve	that	particular	disagreement	before	being	able	to	use	that	
																																								 																				
44	For	an	example	of	this	kind	of	argument,	see	R.	Dworkin,	Freedom’s	Law:	The	Moral	Reading	of	the	American	
Constitution,	(OUP,	1996),	p.	32.	
45		We	can	expect	a	similar	disagreement		to	emerge	mutatis	mutandis	with	respect	to	republican	liberty	where	the	
meaning	of	‘domination’	will	very	much	be	in	the	eye	of	the	beholder.		See	for	example,	C.	Beitz,	Political	equality,	
(1989),	64.	
46	Such	as	citizens	who	take	a	Dworkinian	view	of	the	question.		See	Dworkin	(1996).	
47	J.	Rawls,	Political	Liberalism,	(Columbia	University	Press,	1993),	whereby	‘many	of	our	most	important	judgments	
are	made	under	conditions	where	it	is	not	be	expected	that	conscientious	persons	with	full	powers	of	reason,	even	
after	free	discussion,	will	arrive	at	the	same	conclusion.’,	58.			
48	See	‘Core	Case’,	1346	and	PC,	23.	
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procedure	to	resolve	disagreement	about	the	right	and	the	good.		That	is,	as	well	as	a	procedure	to	make	
decisions	 in	 the	 face	of	disagreement	about	 the	 right	and	 the	good,	we	will	 also	need	a	 second,	 further,	
procedure	 to	 resolve	 disagreement	 about	 the	 institutional	 mechanisms	 by	 which	 such	 first	 order	
disagreement	should	be	resolved,	in	this	case	by	legislatures	or	courts.	This	procedure	must	also	satisfy	the	
requirements	 of	 legitimacy.	 	 Therefore,	 in	 a	 second	 order	 decision-making	 procedure	 to	 resolve	
disagreement	 on	 the	 question	 of	 institutional	 design,	 we	 should	 expect	 again,	 reasonable	 good-faith	
disagreement	as	to	which	procedure	should	be	used	to	make	this	decision.		Various	opinions	and	views	will	
emerge	 in	a	pluralist	 society	envisaged	by	 the	circumstances	of	politics	as	 to	 the	most	 legitimate	way	of	
settling	 this	 second	 order	 disagreement	 such	 as	 whether	 the	 procedure	 should	 involve	 an	 open	
participative	 forum	 operating	 by	 majority	 rule	 such	 as	 a	 constitutional	 convention,	 or	 should	 involve	
bureaucrats	and	elites	behind	closed-doors	for	reasons	of	efficiency	or	expertise,	or	whether	certain	people	
should	 be	 excluded	 from	 this	 particular	 decision-making	 process,	 or	 whether	 the	 results	 of	 the	 process	
should	be	ratified	by	referendum,	or	whether	courts	should	be	charged	with	setting	the	parameters	of	this	
decision-making	process	 in	 terms	of	 validity,	 values	 and	 so	on.	 	 Faced	with	 this	disagreement,	 a	 further,	
third	order,	procedure	would	be	necessary	to	make	decisions	on	these	question.		However,	this	third	level	
of	decision-making	would	also	be	bedeviled	by	disagreement	about	the	optimal	way	to	decide	requiring,	in	
turn,	a	 further	 fourth	 level	procedure	 to	 resolve	disagreement	at	 the	 third	 level	and	 so	on	 leading	 to	an	
infinite	regress	of	procedures.49		
Both	Waldron	and	Bellamy	are	aware	of	the	problem	that	disagreement	about	procedures	presents	for	
their	 defences	 of	 legislative	 supremacy.	 	 However,	 their	 response	 to	 this	 problem	 proves	 to	 be	 self-
defeating,	undermining	the	theoretical	case	for	legislative	supremacy.			
																																								 																				
49	For	discussion,	see	Christiano	(2000),		521.	
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		Waldron,	for	example,	argues	somewhat	tersely	that	even	if	we	disagree	about	procedures	
we	 have	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 consider	 them.50	 	 He	 argues	 that	 there	 are	 important	 reasons	 relating	 to	
legitimacy	 such	as	 ‘fairness,	 voice	 [and]	participation’51	 	which	do	not	arise	other	 than	when	considering	
procedures.	 	 He	 attempts	 to	 stop	 the	 infinite	 regress	 at	 the	 second	 level	 by	 advocating	majority	 rule	 to	
make	decisions	in	the	face	of	disagreement	about	questions	of	 institutional	design.	He	claims	that	using	a	
particular	 procedure	 to	 resolve	 disagreement	 about	 procedures	 at	 this	 level	 is	 not	 to	 ‘privilege’52	 the	
procedure	but	‘simply	to	use	it’.53		At	this	second	level,	Waldron	claims	that	we	are	left	in	a	‘legitimacy	free	
zone	in	which	the	best	that	we	can	hope	for	is	that	a	legitimate	democratic	system	emerges	somehow	or	
other.’54	 	As	such,	he	calls	 for	 ‘pragmatism’	 in	considering	disagreement	at	 this	 level	 ‘because	we	need	a	
procedure	on	this	occasion	and	this	is	the	one	we	are	stuck	with	for	the	time	being.’55	 	However,	such	an	
approach	does	not,	 for	Waldron,	 lead	to	a	results	or	outcome	oriented	approach	because	 ‘pragmatism	 is	
not	necessarily	the	same	as	orientation	to	results.’56	The	pragmatic	solution	to	disagreement	at	this	level	is	
still	a	normatively	infused	procedural	one.	In	any	case,	Waldron	argues,	the	resolution	of	disagreement	at	
this	level	by	reference	to	a	judicial	procedure	is	no	more	legitimate	than	his	solution	of	majority	decision	in	
a	democratic	assembly.57				
	 This	 final	 point	 is	 true	 as	 far	 as	 it	 goes	 but	 it	 constitutes	 an	 unsatisfactory	 tu	 quoquae.		
Claiming	that	an	alternative	potentially	 flawed	procedure	 is	no	better	 than	a	proposed	 flawed	procedure	
does	not	make	the	case	for	that	procedure.		Furthermore,	as	has	been	well	documented,	Waldron’s	more	
general	response	to	this	challenge	of	infinite	regress	is	highly	unsatisfactory.58	First	of	all,	Waldron’s	claim	
that	such	disagreement	brings	us	to	a	‘legitimacy	free	zone’	 is	unsustainable.	 	As	Kavanagh	notes,	 ‘[i]f	we	
																																								 																				
50	‘Core	Case’,	1346.	
51	’Core	Case’,	1372.	
52	LD,	301.	
53	LD,	301.	
54	LD,	300.	
55	LD,	301.			
56	LD,	300.	
57	LD,	302.		
58	See	Christiano	(2000)	Fabre	(2000),	Eisgruber	(2002),	Kavanagh	(2003)	above.	
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use	a	procedure	for	political	decision-making	without	knowing	whether	it	is	legitimate	or	not,	then	we	have	
no	reason	to	accept	the	outcome	of	such	a	procedure	as	authoritative.’59	 	Secondly,	Waldron’s	claim	that	
there	 is	 no	 privileging	 of	 democratic	 majority	 rule	 in	 resolving	 this	 procedure	 is	 to	 claim	 a	 spurious	
neutrality	 for	 his	 own	 viewpoint.	 	We	 disagree	 about	what	 precisely	 ‘fairness,	 voice	 [and]	 participation’	
means.		As	such,	majority	rule	is	far	from	‘neutral’	among	conceptions	of	these	ideals,	but	is	rather	in	itself	
‘a	distinct	conception	of	that	ideal.’60			Finally,	however,	and	most	problematically,	Waldron’s	advocacy	of	
majority	decision	in	relation	to	second	order	disagreement	about	procedures	violates	the	very	basis	of	his	
criteria	 for	a	 legitimate	decision-making	procedure.	 	 	This	 is	due	to	the	 fact	 that	 in	advocating	the	use	of	
majority	 rule	 to	 resolve	 disagreement	 about	 whether	majority	 rule	 is	 legitimate,	Waldron	 automatically	
disadvantages	 or	 excludes	 those	who	 disagree	 that	majority	 rule	 is	 the	 fairest	 procedure	 to	 resolve	 this	
disagreement.	 	 If	the	core	of	 legitimacy	for	Waldron	is	to	provide	reasons	to	hypothetical	citizens	such	as	
Cn	as	to	why	a	body	gets	to	make	a	decision	and	why	their	opinion	was	not	given	more	weight,61	then	his	
response	fails	to	give	hypothetical	citizens	such	as	Cn	reasons	to	accept	the	use	of	majority	rule	in	respect	
of	this	second	order	disagreement	about	procedures.		This	is	because	a	citizen	who	disagrees	with	majority	
rule	as	a	method	of	 resolving	this	disagreement	has	had	no	say	 in	 the	use	of	majority	rule	to	decide	this	
second	order	disagreement	nor	been	given	 reasons	as	 to	why	her	preference	 for,	 say,	 judicial	 resolution	
was	 not	 given	more	weight	 in	 the	 decision	 (or,	 in	 fact,	 not	 given	 any	weight	 at	 all).62	 	 The	 result	 is	 that	
Waldron’s	attempt	to	pragmatically	resolve	this	disagreement	does	violence	to	the	very	foundations	of	this	
defence	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism,	making	his	argument	ultimately	self-defeating.63	
																																								 																				
59	Kavanagh	(2003),	469.	
60	Eisgruber	(2002),	37.	
61	See	above,	part	2.	
62	One,	potential,	defence	of	Waldron’s	position	is	that	in	his	hypothetical	situation	legislative	supremacy	is	what	we	
are	‘stuck	with’	(LD,	301)	and	that	it	is	pragmatic	to	continue	with	what	we	have.		However	this	only	works	if	the	
system	is	one	that	actually	practices	legislative	supremacy.		Given	that	Waldron	claims	to	be	putting	forward	a	general	
theory,	applicable	to	constitutional	democracies	tout	court	(LD,	4-8),	if	we	happen	to	be	‘stuck	with’	a	procedure	
which	practices	judicial	supremacy,	even	in	relation	to	this	second	order	question,	then	this	argument	fails,	at	least	
from	the	viewpoint	of	endorsing	a	path	to	legislative	supremacy.	
63	Christiano	(2000),		250.	In	a	more	recent	defence	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism	Waldron	has	
acknowledged	the	critique	of	the	self-defeating	nature	of	his	argument	made	by	Christiano.		However,	he	responds	
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Bellamy’s	attempt	to	overcome	the	problem	of	infinite	regress	suffers	a	similar	fate.		Unlike	
Waldron,	 he	 accepts	 that	 in	 attempting	 to	 establish	 procedures	 to	 resolve	 second	 order	 disagreement	
about	institutional	design,	that	any	procedure	adopted,	without	justification,	will	appear	arbitrary	to	those	
who	hold	alternative	views	on	the	legitimacy	of	institutional	design.64			Furthermore,	given	his	commitment	
to	disagreement	all	the	way	down,	stopping	the	regress	in	some	sort	of	consensus	about	the	rules	or	rights	
necessary	even	for	legislative	supremacy,	is	not	available	to	him.			As	such,	Bellamy	resigns	himself	to	the	
fact	that:65	
‘We	 simply	 have	 to	 grasp	 this	 procedural	 nettle	 and	 start	 somewhere	 –	 be	 that	 the	 ‘already	 existing’	
political	 system,	 or	 –	 in	 the	 case	 of	 new	 regimes	 emerging	 from	 war	 or	 revolution	 –	 with	 whatever	
arrangements	can	be	cobbled	together	to	get	the	process	of	designing	a	regime	off	to	a	start.’	
	 In	so	doing,	Bellamy	seems	to	be	more	genuinely	pragmatic	than	Waldron	on	this	point	as	he	
seems	 to	 accept	 that	 whatever	 can	 be	 ‘cobbled	 together’	 may	 not	 conform	 to	 his	 ideal	 of	 legislative	
supremacy.	 	As	such,	he	 is	more	genuinely	sensitive	to	problems	of	disagreement	about	procedures	than	
Waldron	and	accepts	that	this	is	something	which	must	be	constantly	revisited.		Once	something	has	got	off	
the	 ground,	 however,	 Bellamy	warns	 against	 constitutionalizing	 these	 initial	 procedures	 as	 there	will	 be	
disagreements	 about	 the	 procedures.	 The	 procedures	 must,	 therefore,	 be	 left	 open	 because	 we	 are	
constantly	‘building	the	ship	at	sea’.66	
However,	Bellamy’s	solution	to	 the	problem	of	 infinite	 regress,	while	arguably	 taking	more	
seriously	 disagreement	 about	 procedures	 for	 deciding	 the	 most	 legitimate	 institutional	 design,	 is	 also	
problematic.	 Firstly,	 in	 acknowledging	 that	we	 are	 building	 the	 constitutional	 ship	 at	 sea,	 his	 defence	 of	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																								
that	Christiano	‘makes	no	attempt	to	show	that	this	is	a	vicious	regress’.	(2006:	1371).		However,	once	it	is	shown	that	
the	regress	is	infinite,	the	fact	that	it	is	vicious	or	not	is	immaterial;	either	way	it	is	unworkable	for	the	purposes	of	the	
debates	on	the	legitimacy	of	legislative	supremacy.		To	not	classify	it	further	as	a	particular	type	of	infinite	regress	is	
irrelevant	to	the	problem	that	the	infinite	regress	poses	for	his	defence	of	legislative	supremacy.			
64	PC,	173.	
65	PC,	174.	
66	PC,	174.	
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legislative	supremacy	only	works	if	the	‘ship’	one	finds	oneself	on	is	one	that	already	to	an	extent	conforms	
to	Bellamy’s	 preference	 for	 legislative	 supremacy.	 	 In	 such	 a	 case,	 the	path	 to	 legislative	 supremacy	 is	 a	
relatively	 smooth,	 if	 not	 necessarily	 automatic	 one.	 	 However,	 if	 the	 ‘ship’	 is	 one	which	 practices	 some	
version	of	judicial	supremacy	in	the	resolution	of	this	issue,	and	the	resultant	design	is	one	which	conforms	
with	 judicial	 supremacy,	 then	 to	 change	or	 transform	 it	 to	Bellamy’s	 requirements,	 that	 is	 to	amend	 the	
system	from	judicial	supremacy	to	legislative	supremacy,	runs	the	risk	of	arbitrariness.		Such	a	move	would	
therefore	 violate	 the	 foundation	 of	 his	 conception	 of	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 legislative	 supremacy	 through	 a	
violation	of	republican	freedom.	Moreover,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	the	constant	revision	of	procedures	
will	result	in	legislative	supremacy.		We	can	expect	such	a	proposal	to	be	highly	unstable.		If	procedures	are	
always	up	for	grabs,	then	it	becomes	impossible	to	guarantee	that	legislative	supremacy	will	actually	result	
from	such	disagreement67,	and	even	 if	 it	does,	 it	may	not	 last	very	 long.	More	problematically,	however,	
notwithstanding	 Bellamy’s	 sensitivity	 to	 disagreement	 about	 institutional	 design,	 he,	 like	 Waldron,	
implicitly	privileges	legislative	majority	voting	in	the	resolution	of	this	second	order	disagreement,	arguing	
that	 democracy	 can	 be	 ‘self-constituting’,	 and	 that	 it	 ‘retains	 an	 authority	 and	 legitimacy	 that	 is	
independent	from	the	right	or	wrongness	of	the	policies	 it	 is	employed	to	decide	–	 including	those	about	
democracy	itself’.68		However,	as	with	Waldron’s	position,	in	the	circumstances	of	politics	we	must	expect	
people	 to	 reasonably	 disagree	 on	 whether,	 in	 fact,	 democracy	 retains	 an	 independent	 authority	 and	
legitimacy.	 	 Thus,	 Bellamy’s	 proposed	 solution	 to	 the	 infinite	 regress	 makes	 his	 defence	 of	 institutional	
political	constitutionalism	self-defeating	in	two	ways;		either	because,	it	requires	remaining	agnostic	to	the	
very	 question	 at	 issue,	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 institutional	 legal	 or	 political	 constitutionalism,	 given	 that	 the	
process	 would	 be	 highly	 unstable	 and	 could	 either	 oscillate	 frequently	 between	 judicial	 and	 legislative	
supremacy	or	settle	into	judicial	supremacy,	or	because	it	entails	a	form	of	domination	in	arbitrarily	insists	
upon	change	where	the	process	of	the	resolution	of	the	disagreement	regarding	institutions	produces	the	
‘wrong	answer’.			
																																								 																				
67	See	Christiano	(2000)	on	this	point.	
68	Bellamy	(2007),	141.	
	 	 	
	
	 15	
In	 the	 circumstances	 of	 politics	 we	 would	 expect	 citizens	 to	 disagree	 as	 much	 about	
procedures	as	substantive	values.		In	the	light	of	such	disagreement,	including	on	particular	procedures	and	
their	legitimacy,	the	process-based	arguments	advanced	by	Bellamy	and	Waldron	do	not,	as	claimed,	weigh	
unilaterally	 in	 favour	 of	 legislative	 supremacy	 but	 are	 themselves	 inconclusive.	 	 This	 is	 because	 in	 the	
circumstances	of	politics	we	would	expect	 some	citizens	 to	 reject	Waldron’s	and	Bellamy’s	arguments	 in	
favour	of	 legislative	 supremacy	and	so	 there	 is	no	 ‘trump’	argument	which	can	authoritatively	 settle	 this	
disagreement	in	a	non	question-begging	way.			
If	 the	 question	 of	 procedures	 in	 providing	 a	 legitimate	 response	 to	 the	 circumstances	 of	
politics	are	contingent	or	inconclusive	due	to	the	disagreement	which	would	affect	this	very	question,	then	
procedures	 cannot	 do	 the	 work	 that	 Waldron	 and	 Bellamy	 attribute	 to	 them	 in	 legitimizing	 majority		
decision-making	 in	 the	circumstances	of	politics.	 	Procedural	questions	of	 institutional	design	such	as	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 legislative	 or	 judicial	 supremacy	 are	 relatively69	 irrelevant	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 political	
value.	 	There	 is	 thus	a	gap	 in	questions	of	substantive	value	and	 institutional	design	which	 is	revealed	by	
the	self-defeating	nature	of	their	arguments.70			
																																								 																				
69		I	say	relatively	because	we	are,	of	course,	working	within	certain	boundaries	of	a	reasonably-efficient	and	
reasonably	well-ordered	constitutional	democracy.		This	argument	does	not	apply	to	dictatorships	or	other	non-
democratic		tyrannical	regimes.		This	is	within	the	parameters	of	the	debate	on	political	constitutionalism.		See	further	
below.	
70	This	gap	has	been	identified	by	other	writers	on	the	topic	such	as	Rawls	and	Michelman.		Rawls	was	agnostic	to	the	
question	of	institutional	design,	at	least	in	terms	of	judicial	or	legislature	securing	of	the	values	of	overlapping	
consensus,	in	his	defence	of	political	liberalism.	He	argued	that	‘[p]olitical	liberalism	as	such,	it	should	be	stressed,	
does	not	assert	or	deny	any	of	the	[claims	of	legislative	or	judicial	supremacy]	and	so	we	need	not	discuss	them.’	
(Rawls	(1996),	235)			All	that	matters,	Rawls	argues,	is	that	whichever	choice	is	made,	or	practice	pursued,	that	public	
reason	feature	in	such	choice	or	practice.		Similarly,	Michelman,	considering	the	relationship	between	political	
liberalism	and	political	legitimacy,	also	illustrates	the	gap	between	substantive	value	and	institutional	design.	(F.	
Michelman,	‘Ida’s	Way:	Constructing	the	Respect-Worthy	Governmental	System’	(2003)	72	Fordham	Law	Review	345.)	
	He	adopts	a	similar	device	to	Waldron	in	assessing	the	legitimacy	of	political	institutions	by	imaging	a	hypothetical	
citizen,	Ida,	and	how	she	might	appraise	the	legitimacy	of,	in	this	case,	the	US	constitution.	(see	further	below).	
However,	notwithstanding	his	linking	of	legitimacy	to	political	liberalism,	he	concludes	that	the	question	of	
institutional	design	is	inconclusive.		For	Ida,	and	therefore	vicariously	Michelman,	the	practice	of	judicial	or	legislative	
supremacy	‘neither	defeats	appraisal	nor	points	toward	a	negative	appraisal’	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	system.	(361)	
One	can	easily	conceive	of	a	respect	worthy	governing	totality	which	practices	institutional	political	constitutionalism	
as	institutional	legal	constitutionalism.	(361)		
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	Furthermore,	 if	we	disagree	as	much	about	procedures	as	we	do	about	outcomes,	 then	 it	
appears	that,	in	fact,	outcomes	matter	more	than	procedures.	If	we	really	believe	in,	for	example,	securing	
the	 optimal	 protection	 of	 fundamental	 rights,	 or	 securing	 the	 welfare	 of	 the	 citizenry	 then,	 it	 doesn’t	
matter	 whether	 it’s	 done	 by	 courts	 or	 legislatures	 as	 long	 as	 it’s	 done.71	 	 We	 should	 therefore	 ignore	
procedures	and	‘pass	to	the	interesting	topic	[of	substantive	disagreement]	straight	away’72,	or	simply	‘take	
a	 stand	on	 the	 issue	of	 substance	and	be	done	with	 it.’73	 	 	 If	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 then	Waldron	or	Bellamy’s	
argument	 for	 legislative	 supremacy	 is,	 in	 effect,	 a	 ‘non-starter’74	 as	 it	 is	 based	 almost	 entirely	 on	 the	
superior	procedural	legitimacy	of	legislatures	vis-à-vis	courts.		
4. Authority	and	Disagreement		
The	root	of	the	problem	with	Waldron	and	Bellamy’s	defences	of	legislative	supremacy	outlined	in	the	
previous	section	lie	in	their	common	point	of	departure,	the	circumstances	of	politics.		As	will	be	recalled,	
the	 circumstances	 of	 politics	 relates	 to	 the	 necessity	 of	 decision-making	 by	 a	 group	 as	 a	 whole,	
notwithstanding	 substantive	 good	 faith	 disagreement	 surrounding	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 decision	 with	 the	
caveat	 that	 the	 disagreement	 is	 not	 of	 such	 an	 intensity	 that	 it	 is	 better	 to	 go	 it	 alone.75	 	 What	 the	
circumstances	of	politics	requires,	then,	is	a	theory	of	authority	which	makes	up	the		‘common	framework,	
decision	or	course	of	action’76.		This	is	what	Waldron	and	Bellamy	proceed	to	devise	in	terms	of	legislative	
supremacy.	 	 However	 the	 problems	 with	 their	 theories	 outlined	 above	 in	 terms	 of	 disagreement	 about	
procedures	lie	in	the	fact	that	their	responses	to	the	circumstances	of	politics	are	inadequate	as	theories	of	
authority.		
																																								 																				
71	Raz,	(1998),	45-6.	
72	PC,	173.	
73	’Core	case’,	1371.	
74	PC,	172.	
75	Christiano	(2000),	518.	
76	LD,	102.	
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	Perhaps	the	most	important	criteria	of	a	theory	of	authority	is	that	the	act	of	the	authority	must	not	
replicate	the	disagreement	which	created	the	necessity	for	the	authority	 in	the	first	place.	 	Authorities,	 if	
they	are	to	discharge	their	 function	as	authorities	must	provide	 ‘second	order	exclusionary	reasons’77	 for	
action,	which	are	independent	of	the	merits	of	the	first	order	reasons	about	which	we	reasonably	disagree	
in	 the	 circumstances	 of	 politics.78	 	 As	 such,	 the	 directives	 of	 the	 authority	 must	 be	 preemptive.	 In	
establishing	 a	 framework,	 decision	 or	 course	 of	 action,	 the	 authority	 must	 do	 so	 independently	 of	 the	
individual	merits	of	the	reasons	advanced	by	opposing	sides	in	the	disagreement.	Given	that	the	decisions	
of	an	authority	are	 independent	of	 their	substantive	merit,	 its	directives	are	necessarily	 ‘arbitrary’79	 from	
the	viewpoint	of	the	substantive	merits	of	the	decision	itself.80	
	 A	further	dimension	of	authority	is	that	the	authority	provides	some	sort	of	benefit	to	those	
who	 live	 under	 the	 authority.	 	 Raz’s	 service	 conception	 of	 authority	 is	 a	 contemporary	 example	 of	 this	
second	 dimension.	 For	 Raz,	 an	 entity	 is	 an	 authority	 if	 the	 subjects	 of	 the	 authority	 are	 more	 likely	 to	
comply	 with	 the	 reasons	 that	 apply	 to	 them	 if	 they	 follow	 the	 directives	 of	 the	 authority	 than	 if	 they	
attempt	to	comply	with	those	reasons	directly	themselves.81	As	such,	the	authority	provides	a	benefit	to	its	
subjects	in	that	it	helps	them	do	more	efficiently	and	easily	what	they	would	do,	or	have	to	do,	anyway.82		
The	authority	is	therefore	‘serviceable’83	in	this	sense.		This	‘serviceability’	provides	the	basic	justification	of	
authority.	
																																								 																				
77	J.	Raz,		Practical	Reason	and	Norms,	(Hutichison,	1975),	36.	
78	The	difference	between	first	order	and	second	order	exclusionary	reasons	lies	in	the	fact	that	whereas	a	subject	
may	act	upon	the	preponderance	of	the	balance	of	first	order	reasons,	weighing	up	different	reasons	and	acting	upon	
what	she	thinks	are	the	‘best’	reasons,	when	second	order	exclusionary	reasons	apply,	because,	for	example,	an	
authority	has	made	a	decision	on	the	matter,	the	subject	of	authority	must	act	on	whatever	the	authority	decides	
regardless	of	what	she	actually	thinks	about	the	individual	merit	of	the	directive	of	the	authority.	Raz	(1975)	above.	
79	LD,	96.	
80	Which,	as	Waldron	notes,	is	one	of	the	central	tenets	of	normative	legal	positivism.		LD,	Ch.	6.	
81	What	Raz	calls	the	‘normal	justification	thesis’.		Raz,	’Authority,	Law	and	Morality’	in	J.	Raz,	Ethics	in	the	Public	
Domain,	(Clarendon:	1994),	214.	
82	Raz	stresses	that	this	does	not	mean	that	authorities	always	operate	in	this	manner	but	rather	that	an	authoritative	
institution	such	as	law	must	at	least	claim	to	be	serviceable	in	this	way.		Ibid.	
83	Raz	(1994)	219.	
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The	 ‘reasons’	 in	 Raz’s	 service	 conception,	 then,	 relate	 to	 the	 general	 benefits	 which	 accrue	 from	
societal	coordination	on	certain	issues.	In	the	state	setting	the	relevant	‘reasons’	that	apply	to	subjects	of	
the	 authority,	 that	 is	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 state,	 constitute	 the	 general	 benefits	 of	 societal	 coordination	
provided	 by	 authority	 from	 which	 everyone	 in	 the	 society	 mutually	 benefits.	 	 Thus	 a	 system	 of	 tax	
collection	and	distribution,	policing,	welfare,	public	transport	etc.	are	better	achieved	through	an	authority	
than	through	multiple	individual	attempts	at	coordination.		These	benefits	have	elsewhere	been	called	the	
‘goods	 of	 the	 political’84	 and	 provide	 the	 bedrock	 of	 the	 justification	 of	 the	 authority	 of	 states	 or	
constitutions.85	
As	Waldron	himself	points	out,	the	second	order	exclusionary	nature	of	the	directives	of	an	authority	
and	the	serviceability	of	the	authority	are	connected.86		In	order	for	an	authority	to	discharge	its	function	of	
helping	individuals	comply	with	reasons	that	apply	to	them,	it	must	be	a	credible	alternative	to	figuring	out	
what	 is	 to	 be	done	by	 the	 subjects	 themselves	 on	 a	 particular	matter.87	 	 	 In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 credible	
alternative	to	acting	independently,	then,	the	directives	of	an	authority,	such	as	a	law,	must	be	identifiable	
to	the	subjects	of	the	authority	without	reference	to	the	substantive	merits	of	the	directive	itself.	 	This	 is	
because	 if	 the	criteria	 for	ascertaining	whether,	 for	example,	a	 law	 is	authoritative,	 requires	a	 subjective	
evaluation	by	citizens	with	regard	to	the	merits	of	the	law,	they	are	essentially	trying	to	act	on	the	reasons	
that	apply	 to	 them	directly	 rather	 than	 through	 the	authority.	 	 In	 such	a	case,	 the	authority	 is	no	 longer	
doing	 the	 ‘work’	 necessary	 to	make	 it	 an	 authority;	 that	 is	 helping	 subjects	 to	 comply	with	 reasons	 that	
apply	to	them	more	fully	and	efficiently	than	if	they	try	to	act	on	them	independently.88		
It	is	this	arbitrariness	of	the	merit	of	the	directives	of	an	authority	combined	with	the	achievement	of	
the	goods	of	the	political	that	create	problems	for	both	Waldron	and	Bellamy	in	their	defences	of	political	
																																								 																				
84	See	Michelman	(2003),	above.	
85	Raz	(1998),	above.	
86	LD,	96.	
87	LD,	96.	
88	LD,	96.	
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constitutionalism	qua	theories	of	authority.		Firstly,	they	fail	to	tie	a	theory	of	authority	sufficiently	‘tightly’	
to	democratic	decision-making	by	majority	rule	(i.e.	legislative	supremacy).89			Both	Waldron	and	Bellamy’s	
starting	point	in	the	circumstances	of	the	politics	presuppose	a	theory	of	authority	which	is	legitimated	or	
‘serviceable’	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	it	achieves	the	goods	of	the	political,	regardless	of	how	it	does	it.		As	
such,	 any	 decision-making	 procedure,	 including	majority	 decision	 in	 a	 democratically	 elected	 legislature,	
will	 necessarily	 be	 subject	 to	 this	 overarching	 purpose	 of	 securing	 ‘coordination	 points’90	 to	 provide	 the	
goods	 of	 the	 political.	 	 	 If	 there	 are	 better,	 or	 even	merely	 alternative	means	 of	 securing	 ‘coordination	
points’	 such	 as	 decision-making	 by	 courts,	 then	 these	 will	 satisfy	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 circumstances	 of	
politics	equally	well.	 	As	 such	 the	 ‘coordination	points	are	doing	all	 the	work	 [given	 that]	 the	method	of	
decision	 making	 is	 not	 inherently	 relevant	 to	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 agent	 that	 selects	 among	 these.’91		
Significantly,	 this	 fact	 makes	 a	 particular	 decision-making	 procedure	 such	 as	 majority	 decision	 in	 a	
legislature	a	contingent	feature	of	authority	as	it	will	only	be	authoritative	to	the	extent	to	which	it	achieves	
the	goods	of	the	political,	that	is,	that	it	effectively	selects	coordination	points.		
		Secondly,	 and	 perhaps	 more	 problematically,	 democratic	 majority	 decision	 fails	 as	 a	 theory	 of	
authority	with	reference	to	disagreement	about	procedures	more	specifically.		As	noted,	an	authority	must	
make	a	decision	without	replicating	the	disagreement	on	the	substance	of	the	issue	upon	which	it	is	called	
upon	 to	act.	 	 Therefore,	 faced	with	disagreement	about	whether	majority-decision	 in	 a	 legislature	 is	 the	
fairest	way	to	decide,	an	integral	part	of	the	circumstances	of	politics,	we	cannot	rely	on	majority	–decision	
in	a	legislature	as	a	criteria	for	authority	as	this	simply	replicates	the	disagreement.		In	Razian	terms,	such	
an	account	of	authority	fails	to	help	us	to	better	comply	with	the	reasons	which	apply	to	us	in	this	case	–	
devising	a	 fair	 and	 just	decision	making	procedure–	as	 the	 criteria	provided	does	not	offer	 second	order	
exclusionary	reasons	but	rather	reintroduces	first	order	reasons.		As	such,	Waldron	and	Bellamy’s	solution	
																																								 																				
89	See	Christiano	(2000)	528.			Whereas	the	focus	in	illustrating	this	critique	applies	primarily	to	Waldron’s	account,	it	
applies	mutatis	mutandis	to	Bellamy’s	account.	
90	Christiano	(2000),	528.	
91	Ibid.		
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essentially	means	that	individuals	faced	with	the	circumstances	of	politics	on	this	question	end	up	having	to	
act	independently	on	the	reasons	which	apply	to	them	and	continue	to	work	out	for	themselves	what	the	
fairest	decision-making	procedure	is.	 	The	authority	of	majority	decision	and	legislative	supremacy	fails	to	
be	 ‘serviceable’	 and	 therefore	 violates	 the	 most	 fundamental	 tenet	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 authority,	 that	
decisions	 are	 made	 independently	 of	 the	 substantive	 merits	 of	 the	 different	 viewpoints	 held	 in	 the	
circumstances	of	politics.				
What	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	 needs,	 then,	 in	 attempting	 to	 advocate	 legislative	
supremacy	as	 the	most	 legitimate	 form	of	decision-making	 in	 the	 circumstances	politics,	 not	 least	 in	 the	
contemporary	 context	 of	 increased	 juridification,	 is	 an	 account	 of	 authority	 which	 entails	 legislative	
supremacy	underpinned	by	moral	 reasons	which	do	not	 replicate	 the	disagreement	on	 this	point;	 that	 is	
reasons	which	 do	 not	 relate	 to	 the	per	 se	 legitimacy	 of	majority-decision	 in	 a	 legislature	 on	 grounds	 of	
equality	 or	 democracy.	 Such	 an	 authoritative	 legislature	 must,	 furthermore,	 achieve	 the	 goods	 of	 the	
political	as	the	basic	criteria	for	any	‘servicable’	conception	of	authority.		Such	an	account	of	the	authority	
of	 majority	 decision	 in	 a	 legislature	 can	 be	 created	 by	 combining	 Waldron	 and	 Bellamy’s	 defence	 of	
institutional	political	constitutionalism	with	a	conception	of	authority	which	has	been	called	the	 ‘minimal	
theory	of	legitimacy’.92	
5. The	Minimal	Theory	of	Legitimacy	
The	 ‘minimal	 theory	 legitimacy’93	 departs	 from	 the	 premise	 that	 where	 an	 authority	 is	 a	
matter	 of	 ‘social	 fact’,	 that	 is	 where	 it	 in	 practice	 reasonably	 successfully	 achieves	 the	 ‘goods	 of	 the	
political’,	then	it	is	‘self-legitimating’.94		Factual	authorities	serve	to	‘concretize’95	moral	principles	by	‘giving	
																																								 																				
92	RH	Fallon	Jr,	‘Legitimacy	and	the	Constitution’	(2004)	118	Harvard	Law	Review	1787.			
93	The	phrase	is	Fallon’s,	(2004)	however	it	applies	to	a	number	of	different	writers	who	have	put	forward	similar	ideas	
and	ways	about	thinking	about	operational	constitutions.		See	Michelman	(2003)	and	J.	Raz,	‘On	the	Authority	and	
Interpretation	of	Constitutions:		Some	Preliminaries’	in	L.	Alexander	(ed.),	Constitutionalism:		Philosophical	
Perspectives,	(CUP,	1998).	(hereinafter	AIC)	
94	AIC,	174.	
95	AIC,	172.			
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them	the	concrete	content	they	must	have	in	order	for	people	to	be	able	to	follow	them.’96		As	such,	moral	
considerations	 ‘underdetermine’97	 the	 effective	 achievement	 of	 moral	 principles	 through	 securing	 the	
goods	of	the	political.		Political	values	such	as	democracy,	equality,	liberty	or	the	protection	of	human	rights	
rely	on	the	securing	of	the	goods	of	the	political	 in	order	to	be	given	expression,	and	in	this	way	‘factual’	
authorities	have	a	legitimacy	independent	of	these	substantive	values.	
Furthermore,	 in	 its	focus	on	the	achievement	of	the	goods	of	the	political	as	a	prerequisite	
for	‘concretizing’	moral	principles,	the	minimal	theory	encourages	us	to	look	at	an	authority	such	as	state	or	
constitution	in	the	round	as	a	‘government	totality’98,	rather	than	looking	at	individual	provisions,	practices	
or	 laws	 applied	 by	 the	 authority.	 	 Thus,	 in	 assessing	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 an	 authority	we	must	 look	 at	 the	
‘entire	 aggregate	 of	 concrete	 political	 and	 legal	 institutions,	 practices,	 laws,	 and	 legal	 interpretations	
currently	in	force	or	occurent’99		within	that	country.		Under	the	minimal	theory,	such	an	authority	does	not	
have	 to	 secure	 the	goods	of	 the	political	perfectly	or,	more	 importantly,	perfectly	 justly,	provided	 that	 it	
does	so	reasonably	well	and	in	a	reasonably	fair	and	just	way.	As	such	the	minimal	theory	takes	jurisdictions	
as	 it	 finds	 them	 and	 examines	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 can	 enjoy	 a	 baseline	 or	 minimum	 amount	 of	
legitimacy	through	securing	the	goods	of	the	political.		This	moral	thrust	of	the	minimal	theory	of	legitimacy	
has	been	captured	by	the	metaphor	of	a	 ‘leaky	boat’;	where	 it	 is	better	to	be	at	sea	 in	a	 leaky	boat	than	
have	no	boat	at	all.100	
The	 securing	 of	 the	 goods	 of	 the	 political	 by	 an	 authority	 according	 to	 the	 criteria	 of	 the	
minimal	theory,	then	creates	strong	‘moral	motivation’101	on	behalf	of	citizens	to	support	the	practices	of	
an	 existing	 authority	 as	well	 as	 providing	moral	 justification	 ‘for	 the	mobilization	 of	 social	 pressure	 and	
																																								 																				
96	Ibid.	
97	AIC,	172.	
98	Michelman	(2003),	347.		
99	Michelman	(2003),	347.	
100	D.	Copp,	‘The	Idea	of	a	Legitimate	State’	(1999)	28(1)	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs,	44.	
101	Michelman	(2003),		357.	
	 	 	
	
	 22	
public	force	as	required	to	ensure	compliance’102	with	the	directives	of	an	authority.		As	such,	‘governments	
are	morally	justified	in	demanding	everyone’s	compliance	with	all	the	laws	that	the	judges	in	that	country	
treat	 as	 validly	 in	 force,	 regardless	 of	 the	 moral	 and	 other	 merits	 and	 demerits	 of	 any	 given	 law.’103		
Submission	to	authority	on	this	view,	therefore	becomes	a	‘moral	duty’104	for	individuals.	 	This	is	the	case	
notwithstanding	the	fact	that	it	may	not	do	so	perfectly	or	to	the	perfect	satisfaction	of	all	of	the	subjects	
of	the	authority.		This	latter	point	is	significant	in	that	it	explicitly	presupposes	the	idea	that	citizens	under	
an	authority	 to	which	 the	minimal	 theory	applies,	will	disagree	about	all	 aspects	of	 the	circumstances	of	
politics,	 about	 the	 question	 of	 the	 right,	 the	 good	 and,	 significantly,	 the	 fairness	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 the	
decision-making	procedures	actually	practiced	under	the	current	constitutional	arrangement.		As	such,	the	
minimal	 theory	 is	 capable	 of	 accommodating	 the	 dissent	 which	 we	 would	 expect	 to	 arise	 in	 the	
circumstances	of	politics	around	questions	of	procedures	in	a	way	which	Waldron’s	and	Bellamy’s	do	not.	
The	 minimal	 theory	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 in	 contexts	 of	 political	 debates	 surrounding	
constitutional	 change.	 	 The	 legitimacy	 enjoyed	 by	 an	 authority	which	 reasonably	 effectively	 secures	 the	
goods	of	the	political,	creates	a	strong		moral	‘presumption	in	favour’105	of	the	authority	over	proposals	for	
change.	 	 As	 a	 proven	 way	 of	 successfully	 achieving	 the	 goods	 of	 the	 political	 and	 concretizing	 moral	
principles,	 an	 existing	 authority	 therefore	 holds	 significant	 moral	 weight.	 	 Constitutional	 change	 could	
potentially		jeopardize	the	morality	of	the	existing	authority;	that	is	fail	to	achieve	the	goods	of	the	political	
or	fail	to	concretize	moral	principles.		As	such,	the	putative	morality	of	a	hypothetical	alterative	forming	the	
basis	of	proposals	for	change	is	of	the	same	nature	as	abstract	moral	principles	in	need	of	concretization.		
They	do	not	enjoy	the	same	weight	as	the	‘social	fact’	of	the	achievement	of	the	goods	of	the	political	and	
this	creates	a	strong	presumption	in	favour	of	continuity	over	change.		
																																								 																				
102	Ibid.	
103	Michelman,	(2003)	346.	
104	Fallon	(2005),	1798.	
105	Copp	(1999),	43,	Emphasis	Added,			Raz		AIC,	175.	
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The	 premises	 supporting	 minimal	 theories	 are	 ‘spare	 and	 uninspiring’106.	 	 	 However,	 as	 a	 minimal	
theory,	it	is	also	not	absolute.		Its	premises	are,	in	principle,	defeasible.		Thus,	there	are	‘boundaries	set	by	
moral	principles’107	which	determine	the	limits	of	the	authority	and	self-legitimacy	of	actual	constitutions	or	
governmental	 structures.	 	 In	 this	 regard,	 then,	minimal	 theories	merely	 ‘define	 a	 threshold	 above	which	
legal	regimes	are	sufficiently	just	to	deserve	the	support	of	those	who	are	subject	to	them	in	the	absence	of	
better,	realistically	attainable	alternatives’.108		As	such,	the	minimal	theory	merely	furnishes	defeasible	‘pro	
tanto’109	reasons	for	the	legitimacy	of	an	existing	authority.		There	is,	the	option,	then,	in	minimal	theories	
to	‘mutiny’110	should	the	captain	of	the	ship	be	incompetent	or	unjust.			
Thus,	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	minimal	 theory	 is	 the	 specification	of	 the	point	 at	which	 an	 actual	
authority	such	as	a	constitution	transgresses	the	threshold	conditions	such	that	 it	 loses	 its	 legitimacy	and	
individuals	are	no	longer	under	a	moral	obligation	to	obey	its	commands.			This	is	a	complex	issue.		Perhaps	
one	easy,	if	abstract,	case	of	when	the	reasons	for	submitting	to	authority	are	defeated	is	that	envisaged	by	
Copp;	that	is	where	societal	needs	‘are	so	poorly	served	by	[an	authority]	that	either	the	society	would	do	
better	 if	 people	 viewed	 themselves	 as	 under	no	moral	 duty	 at	 all	 to	 obey	 the	 law.’111	 That	 is	where	 the	
goods	 of	 the	 political	 are	 so	 poorly	 secured	 by	 an	 authority,	 the	 moral	 obligation	 to	 obey	 dissipates.	
However,	beyond	 this	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 specify	 the	exact	point	at	which	minimal	 theories	are	dislodged	by	
countervailing	moral	considerations.			
Some	 minimal	 theories	 of	 legitimacy	 do,	 however,	 suggest	 that	 the	 threshold	 for	 the	 loss	 of	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 a	 reasonably	 effective	 actually	 existing	 authority	 is	 quite	 high.	 	 Michelman,	 for	 example,	
argues	 that	 in	 considering	 minimal	 legitimacy	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 US	 constitution,	 and	 particularly	 its	
permissive	 attitude	 to	 slavery	 as	 exemplified	by	 the	notorious	Dred	 Scott	 v.	 Sandford	 decision	of	 the	US	
																																								 																				
106	Fallon,	(2005)	1809.	
107	AIC,	173.	
108	Fallon,	(2005)	1798.	
109	Copp,	(1999)	19.	
110	Copp,	(1999)	44.	
111	Copp,	(1999)	43.	
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Supreme	 Court	 of	 1857,	 one	 view	might	 well	 deem	 the	 constitutional	 system	 unworthy	 of	 respect	 and	
therefore	illegitimate	given	that	slavery	was	a	moral	evil	which	defeated	the	presumption	in	favour	of	the	
legitimacy	of	the	constitution.		However,	in	the	spirit	of	disagreement	about	the	legitimacy	of	constitutional	
practices,	 he	 explores	 an	 alternative	 conclusion	 on	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 US	 constitution,	 adopted	 by	 a	
hypothetical	citizen	 ‘Ida’,	who	would	consider	morally	compromised	decisions	such	as	Dred	Scott	 to	be	a	
mistake	within	the	broader	scheme	of	the	constitution,	a	misreading	of	its	provisions	such	that	‘governing	
totality’	 was	 still	 worth	 preserving.	 	 Adopting	 the	 presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	
constitution,	 she	 could	 believe	 that	 this	 individual	 decision	 was	 an	 aberration	 which	 was	 insufficient	 to	
defeat	 the	presumption	 that	 the	governing	 totality	was	 still	 respect-worthy.	 	 	 For	Michelman,	 this	 rather	
high	threshold	for	the	illegitimacy	of	a	constitution	set	by	Ida	is	justified	by	his	version	of	the	circumstances	
of	 politics,	 that	 is	 disagreement	 around	 the	 individual	 appraisals	 of	 the	 system	 itself	 by	 citizens112	 of	
whether	it	 is	worth	saving	or	not	which	stems	from	different	moral	positions	or	‘burdens	of	judgment’.113		
As	such:114	
‘Any	 individual	 social	 critic’s	 mental	 and	 discursive	 process	 of	 system-reconstruction	 undoubtedly	 are	
invaded	by	moral	vectors,	and	the	results	arrived	at	by	various	critics	undoubtedly	are	riven	by	divergence	
of	some	of	the	vectors	arising	in	their	several	minds.’	
The	upshot	of	 this	 is	 that	all	 citizens	who	accept	 the	minimal	 theory	of	 legitimacy	predicated	on	 the	
‘goods	of	the	political’,	all	 ‘have	reason	to	be	tolerant	of	what	they	see	as	moral	mishaps	 in	the	systemic	
history	–	specifically,	by	writing	off	those	mishaps	as	“mistakes”.115	
In	a	similar	way,	Copp	argues	that	the	presumption	in	favour	of	the	legitimacy	of	authority,	whereas	it	
is	 defeasible,	 is	 not	 easily	 dislodged.	 	 Copp	 bases	 his	 argument	 on	 what	 can	 be	 called	 the	 ‘problem	 of	
innocent	 law’	 which	 overlaps	 with	Michelman’s	 approach.	 	 He	 argues	 that	 when	 a	 reasonably	 effective	
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113	Ibid.			
114	Michelman,	(2003)	363.	
115	Michelman,	(2003),	365.	
	 	 	
	
	 25	
state	 provides	 the	 ‘goods	 of	 the	 political’	 and	 enacts	 a	 ‘morally	 innocent’	 law,	 then	 following	 the	
presumption	in	favour	of	legitimacy,	the	state’s	act	is	justified	and	we	have	a	moral	obligation	to	obey	that	
law.116	 	Examples	of	such	morally	 innocent	 laws	 include	 innocent	tax	 laws	or	speed	 limits.	 	However,	 this	
obligation	 still	 holds,	 Copp	 argues,	 where	 the	 state	 enacts	 morally	 egregious	 laws	 alongside	 morally	
innocent	ones.	 	For	example,	he	argues	that	citizens	did	not	have	a	moral	obligation	to	obey	the	morally	
bankrupt	 laws	 of	Nazi	Germany	 or	 the	 fugitive	 slave	 laws	 of	 the	ante	 bellum	 United	 States.117	However,	
they	 did	 have	 an	 obligation,	 to	 obey	 the	morally	 innocent	 laws	 of	 those	 regimes,	 such	 as	 ‘laws	 against	
murder	and	rape,	theft	from	the	mails,	smuggling	and	so	on.’118		Furthermore,	states	had	a	right	to	enforce	
such	laws.119		Thus,	even	in	states	which	entail	morally	egregious	practices,	one	is	still	under	a	moral	duty	to	
obtain	 a	driver’s	 licence	before	driving	 a	 car	 and	buy	a	 ticket	before	using	public	 transport	 if	 the	 law	 so	
requires.120	 	Of	course	 the	morally	egregious	 laws	may	contaminate	 the	 rest	of	 the	system	such	 that	 the	
presumption	in	favour	of	legitimacy	is	defeated	where	the	pro	tanto	reasons	fail.	However	his	point	is	that	
even	if	civil	disobedience	can	be	legitimate	it	‘needs	a	serious	justification	because	it	typically	involves	the	
violation	of	morally	innocent	law.’121		The	upshot	of	his	analysis,	then,	is	similar	to	Michelman’s	conclusion	
that	 the	presumption	 in	 favour	of	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	state	 is	not	easily	dislodged	both	because	bad	or	
wicked	laws	can	be	written	off	as	mistakes	which	require	action	to	save	the	system	or	that	a	vast	swathe	of	
other	 ‘morally	 innocent’	 laws	do	not	 fail	 the	 test	of	 respect-worthiness	as	 they	provide	 the	goods	of	 the	
political.	
What	Michelman	and	Copp	show,	 is	that	the	minimal	 legitimacy	which	authorities	enjoy	by	the	mere	
fact	of	being	authorities,	 is	perhaps	not	as	easily	dislodged	by	countervailing	moral	reasons	as	might	first	
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appear	and	that	the	greater	the	disagreement	about	the	countervailing	reasons,	to	be	expected	under	the	
circumstances	of	politics,		the	lower	their	ability	to	dislodge	the	presumption.			
(i) The	Minimal	Theory	and	the	Authority	of	Institutional	Political	Constitutionalism	
Both	 Waldron	 and	 Bellamy’s	 defense	 share	 the	 same	 major	 premise122	 as	 the	 minimal	 theory,	 the	
achievement	of	the	goods	of	the	political.		Waldron,	for	example,	argues	that	his	justification	of	legislative	
supremacy	presupposes	a	 series	of	 conditions	 similar	 to	 the	 requirements	of	 the	minimal	 theory	 such	as	
democratic	 institutions	 in	 reasonably	 good	 working	 order,	 a	 set	 of	 judicial	 institutions	 in	 good	 working	
order	 charged	 with	 upholding	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 a	 societal	 commitment	 to	 individual	 and	 minority	 rights	
(which	 includes	 the	adoption	of	 a	bill	 of	 rights)123	 and	good	 faith	disagreement	within	 this	 society	 about	
rights.124		Similarly,	Bellamy	bases	his	defence	in	countries	which	have	‘working	democracies	like	the	United	
Kingdom	 and	 the	 other	 twenty-two	 countries	 around	 the	 world	 where	 democratic	 practices	 have	 been	
firmly	 established	 for	 at	 least	 fifty	 years’125	 which	 also	 enjoy	 ‘the	 longest	 traditions	 of	 judicial	
independence,	rights	protection	and	a	stable	system	of	law.’126		
Combining	 the	 minimal	 theory	 of	 legitimacy	 with	 Waldron	 and	 Bellamy’s	 defences	 of	 institutional	
political	constitutionalism,	provides	a	robust	defence	against	proposals	for	increased	judicial	intervention	in	
contexts	 where	 some	 form	 of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	 is	 already	 practiced.	 	 This	 is	 a	 not	
insignificant	role	in	the	light	of	the	spread	of	judicial	review	in	the	past	number	of	decades.127		As	a	theory	
which	 takes	 its	 constitutional	 settlements	 as	 it	 finds	 them,	 the	 minimal	 theory	 necessarily	 includes	 the	
established	relationship	between	 legislatures	and	courts.	 	 	Where	such	a	settlement	 involves	 institutional	
political	constitutionalism,	then	the	minimal	theory	creates	a	moral	presumption	in	favour	of	the	legitimacy	
of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism.	 	Where	 citizens	 disagree	 with	 legislative	 supremacy	 in	 such	 a	
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settlement,	 or	 where	 concrete	 proposals	 are	 advanced	 for	 the	 enhanced	 role	 of	 the	 judiciary	 for	 the	
protection	of	 fundamental	rights,128	then	such	proposals	must	advance	compelling	countervailing	reasons	
against	legislative	supremacy	on	fundamental	rights	grounds	which	defeat	the	presumption	in	favour	of	the	
legitimacy	of	legislative	supremacy.	
Given	that	such	proposals	will	be	competing	with	the	morality	of	 the	actually	existing	authority,	 they	
must	show	that	they	will	more	effectively	achieve	the	goods	of	the	political	in	a	more	legitimate	way,	by	for	
example	 better	 protecting	 fundamental	 rights,	 than	 that	 of	 the	 status	 quo	 of	 institutional	 political	
constitutionalism.				The	required	that	they	must	prove	to	be	more	effective	stems	from	the	fact	that	they	
are,	in	the	context	of	debates	on	constitutional	change,	non-concretized	and	therefore	hold	lesser	weight	
than	 the	 demonstrable	 achievement	 of	moral	 principles,	 including	 the	 protection	 of	 fundamental	 rights,	
through	the	goods	of	the	political	by	the	current	arrangement.		
Adopting	Waldron’s	 dichotomy	 of	 ‘process-based’	 or	 ‘outcomes-based’	 reasons,	 then,	 proposals	 for	
constitutional	change	based	on	enhanced	judicial	protection	must	demonstrate	the	enhanced	legitimacy	of	
a	move	to	 institutional	 legal	constitutionalism	based	on	either	 for	 these	types	of	 reasons.	 	 In	 this	 regard,	
both	types	of	reasons	fail	based	on	precisely	the	arguments	advanced	by	Waldron	and	Bellamy.	 	 It	 is	not	
necessary	 to	 rehearse	 those	 arguments	 here	 suffice	 it	 to	 say	 that	 as	 both	 demonstrate,	 in	 terms	 of	
outcomes	based	reasons,	courts	have,	historically,	proven	no	better	than	legislatures	in	preventing	human	
rights	 violations	 (and	 indeed	 in	 some	 cases	 have	 proven	 to	 be	 more	 egregious	 perpetrators)	 in	
constitutional	democracies.129		Moreover,	as	Waldron	shows,	the	procedural	issues	which	frequently	inform	
arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 legal	 constitutionalism	 	 such	 as	 having	 your	 day	 in	 court	 and	 the	 attention	 to	
individual	cases	tend	to	be	more	rhetorical	than	actual.130	
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With	regard	to	process-based	reasons,	institutional	legal	constitutionalists	must	similarly	demonstrate	
its	 increased	 legitimacy.	 	 Such	 reasons	 must	 be	 ‘authoritative’,	 providing	 ‘second	 order	 exclusionary’	
reasons	for	judicial	supremacy	in	order	to	be	able	to	justify	the	change.		Otherwise	they	fail	as	authoritative	
reasons	 given	 that	 they	would	 replicate	 the	 disagreement	 on	 the	 issue	 that	 requires	 a	 decision;	 a	move	
from	political	to	legal	constitutionalism.		The	types	of	normative	reasons	available	to	legal	constitutionalists	
in	 this	 context	might	 include	 Dworkin’s	 equality-based	 arguments	 for	 judicial	 review	 or	 Ely’s	 arguments	
from	procedure131	 to	argue	 for	 further	 judicial	 intervention	where	political	 constitutionalism	 is	practiced.		
However,	as	Waldron	and	Bellamy	amply	 illustrate,	disagreement	affects	even	 these	baseline	democratic	
ideals	 of	 equality,	 the	 right	 to	 vote	or	 the	 freedom	of	 expression.132	 	 Therefore,	 such	 arguments	 fail	 the	
criteria	 of	 authority	 for	 the	 same	 reasons	 that	Waldron	 and	 Bellamy’s	 defences	 of	 institutional	 political	
constitutionalism	 were	 problematic	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 circumstances	 of	 politics;	 they	 replicate	 the	
disagreement	on	the	question	of	what	such	rights	or	values	mean	and	what	they	require	institutionally.		As	
such,	 the	arguments	advanced	by	 legal	constitutionalists	 lack	 the	relevant	authority	 in	 the	 form	of	moral	
preemption	 to	 dislodge	 the	 presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	 where	
practiced.			
	 It	 is	within	 the	context	of	 the	minimal	 theory	of	 legitimacy,	applying	 to	 jurisdictions	which	
already	practice	 some	 form	of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism,	 then,	 that	Waldron’	 and	Bellamy’s	
defenses	 of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	 can	 achieve	 their	 full	 potential,	 unburdened	 by	 the	
problems	of	 infinite	regress	or	procedural	contingency	which	affected	them	in	the	abstract.	 	The	 ‘fact’	of	
the	 achievement	 of	 the	 goods	 of	 the	 political	 or	 the	 concretization	 of	 moral	 principles	 establishes	 the	
authority	of	the	constitutional	settlement	including	the	practices	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism	
which	 are	 independent	 of	 the	 substantive	 merits	 of	 legislative	 supremacy.	 	 In	 this	 way,	 Waldron’s	 and	
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Bellamy’s	 theories	 can	 do	 real	 work,	 operating	 to	 resist	 proposals	 for	 a	 move	 to	 stronger	 judicial	
intervention	in	the	interests	of	the	protection	of	fundamental	rights.		
6. Defending	the	Partial	Defence	
This	 particular	 defence	 of	 institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	 through	 the	 minimal	 theory	 of	
legitimacy	represents	a	departure	from	the	conventional	model	of	debate	on	political	constitutionalism	in	
that	it	does	not	attempt	to	provide	a	general	defense	of	political	constitutionalism,	a	‘general	theory’	as	it	
were,	suitable	for	all	 jurisdictions,	even	well-ordered	constitutional	democratic	systems.	 	 Its	application	is	
obviously	 limited	 to	 jurisdictions	 which	 currently	 practice	 some	 form	 of	 institutional	 political	
constitutionalism.		In	the	light	of	this	departure	from	the	general	terms	of	the	current	debates	on	political	
constitutionalism,	 it	 is	 open	 to	 two	potential	 objections	 from	 the	 viewpoint	of	 the	 conventional	 debates	
between	 institutional	political	and	 legal	constitutionalism;	 that	 it	does	not	actually	prevent	constitutional	
amendment	from	political	to	legal	constitutionalism	or,	perhaps	more	significantly,	is	not,	in	actual	fact,	a	
defence	of	political	constitutionalism	at	all.			
The	first	objection	to	the	defense	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism	through	the	minimal	theory	
of	 legitimacy	 is	 that	 it	 doesn’t	 actually	 prevent	 change	 to	 enhanced	 judicial	 intervention	 in	 the	manner	
argued	 above	 through	 the	 lack	 of	 countervailing	 moral	 reasons	 for	 the	 enhanced	 legitimacy	 of	 judicial	
review.	 	A	 constitutional	 amendment	 through,	 for	 example,	 parliamentary	majority	or	 referendum	could	
install	institutional	legal	constitutionalism	in	a	jurisdiction	where	political	constitutionalism	is	practiced	and	
the	minimal	theory	can	do	nothing	to	prevent	such	a	change.		This	is	true	as	far	as	it	goes.		However,	this	
objection	fails	to	appreciate	the	distinct	contribution	of	the	minimal	theory	to	political	debates	surrounding	
constitutional	 change	 which	 involves	 distinguishing	 between	 what	 can	 be	 called	 ordinary	 reasons	 and	
‘merit	 reasons’133	 for	 change.	 	 Ordinary	 reasons	 for	 constitutional	 change	 are	 generally	 instrumental,	
whereas	‘merit	reasons’	are	per	se	moral	reasons;	that	is	their	legitimacy	stems	from	the	intrinsic	good	in	
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the	 reasons	 themselves	 rather	 than	 the	 ends	 which	 such	 reasons	 may	 achieve.134	 	 As	 Raz	 notes,	
constitutional	 amendments	 happen	 for	 many	 reasons	 such	 as	 their	 popularity	 with	 the	 electorate,	
increased	 societal	 cohesiveness,	 a	 rejuvenation	 of	 political	 culture	 or	 perceived	 failures	 in	 the	 current	
settlement.135	 	 These	 reasons	 may	 even	 be	 moral	 reasons.136	 	 The	 point	 is	 that	 they	 are	 qualitatively	
different	 reasons	 from	 ‘merit	 reasons’,	 that	 is	 the	per	 se	moral	desirability	of	 any	 specific	 feature	of	 the	
constitution	 such	 as	 individual	 constitutional	 provisions	 which	 encapsulate	 substantive	moral	 postulates	
such	as	liberty	or	equality.		What	the	combination	of	the	minimal	theory	and	the	defences	of	institutional	
political	constitutionalism,	provide,	therefore,	are	merit	reasons	for	resisting	the	change	from	institutional	
political	to	legal	constitutionalism.		These	merit	reasons	will	necessarily	compete	with	ordinary	reasons	in	
proposals	for	constitutional	change	and	may	not	win	on	the	day.		However,	they	will	serve	to	counter		and	
defeat	competing	merit	reasons	from	institutional	legal	constitutionalists	advocating	change	based	on	the	
conventional	appeals	 to	values	such	as	 liberty,	equality	or	democracy	which	 frequently	 form	the	basis	of	
institutional	political	constitutionalism.		
	 The	second	objection	to	the	partial	defence	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism	is	that	
it	is	too	minimal;	that	it	doesn’t	really	say	anything	particular	about	political	constitutionalism.		Rather,	it	is	
a	 form	 of	 general	 theory	 of	 authority	 which	 doesn’t	 really	 contribute	 to	 the	 debates	 about	 political	
constitutionalism	specifically.		As	much	is	clear	from	the	fact	that	the	minimal	theory	can	be	used	to	defend	
legal	constitutionalism	as	well	as	political	constitutionalism	where	it	is	practiced	in	particular	jurisdictions.				
As	 such,	 it	 is	 of	 limited	 significance	 for	 the	 core	 questions	 which	 animate	 political	 constitutionalism	
regarding	the	relationship	between	rights	and	democracy,	courts	and	legislatures.	
	 It	 is	 true	 that	 the	minimal	 theory	can	be	used	to	defend	 institutional	 legal	constitutionalism	as	well	as	
institutional	 political	 legal	 constitutionalism	 where	 practiced.	 	 However,	 what	 the	 critiques	 of	 political	
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constitutionalism	outlined	previously	show	is	that,	in	the	final	analysis,	in	the	circumstances	of	politics,	the	
question	of	institutional	design	is	a	contingent	one	from	the	perspective	of	political	values	such	as	liberty,	
equality	or	democracy.		If	we	use	the	circumstances	of	politics	as	our	starting	point,	emphasizing	the	need	
for	 authority	 in	 the	 face	 of	 disagreement,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 direct	 and	 incontrovertible	 link	 between	 the	
achievement	‘goods	of	the	political’,	substantive	political	values	and	a	particular	institutional	design.137		In	
order	 to	 get	 off	 the	 ground,	 therefore,	 a	 further	 premiss	 must	 be	 added	 for	 defences	 of	 political	
constitutionalism	to	hold.	 	This	additional	premiss	 is	 the	actual	achievement	of	 the	goods	of	 the	political		
provided	 by	 the	 minimal	 theory.	 	 This	 is	 something	 that	 both	 theories	 of	 political	 and	 legal	
constitutionalism	 face.	 	 That	 this	 makes	 the	 defence	 political	 constitutionalism	 only	 a	 partial	 one	 is	 a	
necessary	price	to	pay	if	institutional	political	constitutionalism	is	to	provide	an	adequate	response	to	the	
circumstances	of	politics.			
7.	Conclusion	
This	paper	attempted	to	rescue	theoretical	defences	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism	from	the	
problems	 of	 infinite	 regress	 and	 incoherence	 by	 contextualizing	 these	 arguments	 within	 the	 prior	
conditions	 of	 the	 minimal	 theory	 of	 legitimacy,	 where	 the	 actual	 practices	 of	 institutional	 political	
constitutionalism	hold	normative	weight	independently	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	practice	taken	in	isolation.		
Whereas	it	may	not	prevent	the	spread	of	the	judicialization	of	politics	in	individual	cases,	the	defence	of	
institutional	 political	 constitutionalism	 through	 the	 minimal	 theory	 of	 legitimacy	 provides	 a	 powerful	
normative	 critique	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 judicial	 review	 for	 those	 jurisdictions	 which	 already	 practice	 some	
form	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism	today.		Whereas	for	some	the	partial	defence	of	institutional	
political	 constitutionalism	 may	 be	 something	 of	 a	 pyrrhic	 victory,	 given	 that	 there	 is	 a	 gap	 between	
substantive	 value	and	 institutional	design	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	 circumstances	of	politics,	 resulting	 in	 the	
self-defeating	nature	of	stand	alone	theoretical	defences	of	legislative	supremacy,	this	is	the	best	defences	
such	 as	 Waldron	 and	 Bellamy’s	 can	 hope	 for.	 	 The	 minimal	 theory	 constitutes	 a	 necessary	 prior	 to	
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theoretical	 defences	 of	 legislative	 supremacy	 and	 as	 such	 its	 conditions	 establish	 the	 proper	 place	 of	
arguments	for	the	legitimacy	of	institutional	political	constitutionalism.		
